The failure to delegate powers and the documentary labyrinth threaten to turn integration into a race against obstacles. Catalonia, a community historically marked by migration, faces a difficult contradiction today: it bears a decisive part of the demographic and social pressure, but continues to depend on the State to resolve the main immigration files. The Generalitat manages initial reception, integration, and numerous social services, although it lacks the authority to decide on a significant portion of the documentation that governs the daily lives of migrants.
The data is eloquent. According to the Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya, the Catalan population reached 8,210,710 inhabitants on January 1, 2026. Natural growth is negative in most of the territory, and international immigration sustains demographic growth. Foreigners already represented 18.7% of the population at the beginning of 2025. During the extraordinary regularization of 2026, Catalonia led the country with 257,000 applications, compared to 202,000 in Madrid and 167,000 in the Valencian Community.
The conflict between Barcelona and Madrid is no longer a mere budgetary dispute. Article 149.1.2 of the Constitution grants the State exclusive competence in matters of nationality, immigration, foreign affairs, and asylum law. At the same time, the Statute of Autonomy recognizes the Generalitat with powers in matters of initial reception and integration. This division forces Catalonia to deal with the social consequences of administrative decisions that the central Government continues to make.
In March 2025, the Socialist and Junts parliamentary groups registered an organic law proposal based on Article 150.2 of the Constitution. The text proposed delegating to Catalonia the processing of residence and work permits, the management of foreigner detention centers, certain functions of the Mossos d’Esquadra in ports and airports, and the planning of origin-based hiring. It was not yet an effective transfer, but a project that had to go through parliamentary processing.
The progress was blocked on September 23, 2025. The Congress even rejected taking the proposal into consideration by 177 votes against and 173 in favor. The PP and Vox questioned its constitutional fit, while Podemos and other left-wing sectors criticized the language of the explanatory statement regarding civic values, linguistic knowledge, and cultural integration. The legal consequence was unequivocal: none of those powers were delegated.
In the spring of 2026, the Government launched an extraordinary regularization that received 1,174,978 applications across Spain. More than 600,000 files had been admitted for processing at the end of the first phase, allowing their holders to reside and work provisionally. Therefore, the absolute legal vacuum denounced by some sectors does not exist. However, the volume of applications has tested a centralized administrative structure, while the autonomous communities and municipalities have to absorb the pressure in terms of housing, healthcare, education, and social services.
The documentation issue is particularly sensitive for Ukrainians. Spain has automatically extended the validity of cards issued to people with temporary protection until March 4, 2027. This regime continues to guarantee access to residence, work, healthcare, and education. SEM Instructions 2/2026 do not require immediate abandonment of this protection but open voluntary pathways to obtain ordinary residence, arraigo, or work permits.
The problem arises when a person decides to make this transition. Each permit requires meeting its own conditions and, in many cases, presenting a valid passport, travel document, or registration certificate. For certain Ukrainian men between 18 and 60 years old, verification of their military status may cause delays or consular difficulties. However, it is not legally correct to claim that they all must return to Ukraine or that renewing a passport automatically means being sent to the front: since April 2025, Ukrainian authorities allow passport processing abroad without physically presenting the military document, although data is verified electronically.
Nor can it be argued that Spain operates under an absolute rule of "no passport, no status." The regulations admit, depending on the procedure, travel documents and registration certificates, and beneficiaries of temporary protection can apply for a Spanish travel document when they justify the need to leave the country and do not have a passport. The real risk lies in the unequal application of these alternatives and in the fact that the transition after 2027 arrives without a sufficiently clear protocol.
Closer management could help coordinate registration, employment, training, housing, and social assistance. However, as long as there is no delegation approved by an organic law, the Generalitat cannot unilaterally replace the documents required by state regulations. The solution is not to ignore the law, but to ensure that no integrated person is left in an irregular situation due to documentary obstacles beyond their control.
It is also worth clarifying the scope of Spanish jurisprudence. On February 20, 2025, the Audiencia Nacional declared the extradition of a Ukrainian citizen accused of facilitating, for $4,800, the clandestine departure of men to Moldova, to be inadmissible. The court did not state that all Ukrainian claims were political, nor did it recognize a general right to evade mobilization. It rejected that extradition because the facts did not meet the double incrimination requirement: assisting a national to leave their own country under those circumstances did not have a sufficient criminal equivalent in Spain.
That ruling did not grant asylum nor create general immunity from future extraditions. It did, however, highlight a deeper reality: judicial protection and administrative documentation operate on different planes. A court may reject a specific extradition while a foreigners' office continues to demand documents that the same person has difficulty obtaining.
This is where the real challenge lies. Catalonia has the experience, services, and capacity to build a more localized integration model, but it remains limited by an administrative architecture that separates decisions on documentation from their human consequences. If Madrid wishes to retain these powers, it must also guarantee agile responses, real documentary alternatives, and coordination that prevents legality from becoming a bureaucratic trap.
